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Beziehung zwischen US und deutscher Tabakindustrie Drucken E-Mail
Veröffentlicht von Ernst-Günther Krause   
Mittwoch, 4. Oktober 2006
Dokumente zur Beziehung zwischen der US-amerikanischen und deutschen Tabakindustrie insbesondere dem Verband der Cigarettenindustrie
Notations on Tobacco Industry Documents Related to the Scientific Research Institute of the Association ("Verband”) of German Cigarette Industries (Institut der Wissenschaftlichen Forschungstelle im Verband der Cigaretten-Industrie) in Hamburg, Germany, and its Successor Research Bodies -- Designated in the Documents as the "Verband” or "VdC”.

Except for some introductory material, these notes are in chronological order for demonstration to those researchers also interested in the relationship between the Verband's scientific activities and several transnational cigarette companies. Most of the documents, particularly from RJR, were located on the website for the 39,000 "attorney-client” privileged documents uncovered in the Minnesota lawsuit. See <www.tobaccodocuments.com>. Nearly all documents found are summarized except for redundancies or purely technical reports.

Please be aware that the documents confusingly but consistently use the term "Verband” to refer to the Scientific Department of the Association, sometimes including or not the Research Council, an advisory body to the Scientific Department. Transnational companies such as RJR, Philip Morris, BAT, with branches in Germany, were members of the Association along with the German firm Reemtsma (and others??).

1. 23 July 1992, memo, Charles R. Wall to Murray H. Bring, PM 2022850392 - 402, "Philip Morris Research.”

Wall describes funding to various individuals and institutions around the world (see documents for these names). With respect to the Verband, Wall gives the rationale for supporting research in Germany:

Our 1992 budgeted research contribution is 34% of 8,656,000 DM, or about $1,800,000.... Our scientists feel...that it is important to keep the research money in Germany, i.e., continue to support researchers in Germany even if we are not supporting them through the Verband.... The relationship between the industry and the German government seems to be a good deal better than the relationship between the industry and the government in this country. As I understand it, there are regular consultations between government and industry scientists, as well as constructive discussions regarding smoking-related laws and regulations. The industry in Germany appears to be more influential with the government than the industry in the U.S. and, for that reason, the industry feels it is important to maintain a substantial research presence. Although I do not believe litigation is imminent in Germany, should it occur, the fact that we are sponsoring research -- whether through the Verband, or individually -- could be of substantial help, in convincing a court that we are fulfilling our duty to conduct research. Nor do I think we should downplay the importance of having scientific contacts in as important a country as Germany.

2. 27 June 1980, Edwin Jacob of the law firm Jacob & Medinger, RJR 50468-1987-8, 50468 - 2009-2011, "”James K. Johnston Smoking Issues - Briefing Book.”

Brief gives the history and suggests the rationale for the American cigarette companies' interest in funding and directing the research done by the Verband.

The European tobacco industry's approach to the smoking and health controversy has always been markedly different from the approach taken by the American industry. Several factors probably account for this difference. -- In the early 1950s, the American industry was run largely by people with an agricultural outlook, who were basically skeptical of the claims being made about smoking. In contrast, the European industry, particularly the English industry, was dominated in its consideration of the health issue by chemists and other scientists who often lacked a biological background. These industry scientists saw the statistical association, saw carcinogens in tobacco condensate and concluded that the smoking and lung cancer causation claim was scientifically established. The European industry took the position from the beginning that they had a bad product, and that attitude prevails today. The commencement of litigation in the United States in 1954 encouraged an already skeptical American industry to maintain, if scientifically defensible, the view that the case against smoking had not been proven. The litigation also required lawyers for the American industry to find eminent scientists, from many disciplines, who were of the opinion that smoking had not been scientifically established as a cause of lung cancer. When they were found, they were encouraged by consultation with their colleagues and by continued analysis and research to maintain their views. With the absence of lawsuits in Europe, the European industry seemed content not to contest vigorously the claims made against smoking.... Particularly in England, the industry found that the questioning of government policy and the like by the few scientists who disagreed and who were encouraged in research by the industry was an embarrassment.... As a result of the difference from the U.S. picture, the European industry did not establish organizations to fund independent scientists who could investigate whether or not smoking is a cause of human disease. Instead, industry laboratories were established by the English industry at Harrogate and by the German industry in Hamburg, seemingly in order to examine how smoking might operate in the causation of disease... After the Royal College of Physicians Report was published in 1962, the response of the English industry was muted, not vigorously opposing the later developing views that remedial steps should be taken. Ultimately, this led to various restrictions on advertising, etc.... As to the German industry's institute, it developed over the years the problems that the American industry had anticipated with an industry laboratory. The Germans have established a research program to replace their Institute. Meanwhile, the English industry has sold its laboratory (Harrogate) to Hazelton, which is still carrying forward some industry-financed research.... Recently, the European picture has become clouded by growing recognition of the possibility that litigation problems, formerly reserved to the United States, might now crop up in Europe and elsewhere.

[NB. RJR 50087-7291- 94 gives the statutes of the Research Council for Smoking and Health, its Secretariat, the Cigarette Industry Association and its Scientific Department. PM 2001228258, no date, gives the organizational chart "Scientific Department of the Verband der Cigaretten-Industrie, directed by "Prof. Dr. med.” Franz Adlkofer, with a Research Council for Smoking and Health and its Secretariat advising Prof. Adlkofer and his laboratory in Munich.]

3. Who's Who in America, 1997, page 816.

Colby, Frank Gerhardt, scientific consultant, b. Mulhausen, Germany, Apr. 10, 1915, came to U.S., 1946... dir. rsch. info. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, Winston-Salem, N.C., 1951-70; mgr. sci. info R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, Winston-Salem, 1970-79; assoc. dir. sci. issues 1970-83; sci. cons. rsch. analysis and product liability N.Y.C. 1983 --.

4. 17 December 1997, Deposition of Frank G. Colby "In The Matter of State of Minnesota, et al. V. Philip Morris, et al.”

Colby's position description with RJR states under "PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTABILITIES, the first principal accountability to "Efficiently provide the technical expertise necessary for the Company to combat anti-tobacco claims.” (Page 67 - see also Bates RJR 50088734, 1 December 1982.) In 1983, Colby went to work for Jacob & Medinger Law Firm in New York (page 57). At time of the deposition he was sole proprietor of Frank G. Colby & Associates, with an employment agreement with that company and benefits provided by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco through the Jones Day and Womble Carlyle law firm, in the approximate amount of $120,000 a year plus retirement benefits of about $24,000 a year. (Pages 9-13.)

5. 17 December 1997, Deposition of Frank G. Colby "In The Matter of State of Minnesota, et al. V. Philip Morris, et al.” pages 54-55.

A 1983 memo by Colby and RJR Senior Scientist Alan Rodgman (RJR 501543470 - 3517), "Smoking and Health Related Research Conducted by Philip Morris,” relates that "Throughout the domestic industry, two gentlemen's agreements operative in the early days,” agreed that "any company discovering an innovation permitting the fabrication of an essentially safe cigarette would share the discovery with others in the industry;” and that "no domestic company would use intact animals in-house in biomedical research.”

6. 13 August 1965, RJR 50327-2396, "Abstract of Scientific literature.”

Earliest mention in industry papers turned over to Minnesota of research done at the Verband laboratory dealing with animals made to inhale cigarette smoke and the tumors produced.

7. 15 January 1969, K. Caroll to M. Crohn, RJR 50381- 4318, "Inhalation experiments with cigarette smoke.”

Cites Verband abstract of experiments with golden hamsters:

Long-term cigarettes smoke exposure in hamsters led only occasionally to tracheal papillomas and not to squamous cancer. However, one could sensitize these animals with diethylnitrosamine and enhance the tumor production initiated by this carcinogen by a variety of volatile irritants including tobacco smoke.

[NB. Nitrosamines are a product of burning tobacco.]

8. 4 October 1974, Paul Isenring to various Philip Morris staff and affiliates including Donald Hoel, Shook Hardy & Bacon counsel to ICOSI (International Committee on Smoking Issues, an industry-sponsored public relations institute), PM 1003727787 - 90, "Germany 'Verband'”.

New German food law, if rigorously applied, could create advertising ban on tobacco "plus education programs to curb down cigarette consumption.” Public Health Minister objected to Reemtsma's new nicotine-free cigarette. With the industry being attacked, Verband needed much more "scientific material” on smoking and health, particularly as the French Monopoly claimed their darker cigarettes were healthier than the "light” German cigarettes (fewer smoke, less inhalation). Verband sees necessity to disprove the claim, and also to produce "safer” cigarette.

9. 24 July 1975, Frank Colby letter to Wilfried Dembach (RJR lawyer at Haus Neuerburg, in Cologne, Germany), RJR 50025-9565 and 50025-9421.

Colby offers to keep Dembach abreast of all the research on health and smoking, published or not. Those not in the public domain "may, please, not be quoted in any shape or form.”

10. July 1975, no author, translated from the German, PM 1000219760 - 68, "Germany -- 'Verband'. Reflections towards PR-work of the Cigarette Industry.”

Increasing attacks on the cigarette industry, supported by the Federal Health Ministry. The Verband was not prepared to respond to the attacks. Author suggests that an "information service” be created to influence the media, medical community, health authorities, etc., which would be incorporated in the USA (the "International Tobacco Science Information” [perhaps ICOSI?] and have affiliates in different countries. In Germany, Dr Kirch (pro-tobacco medical author of "The Cigarette”) would be editor of a newsletter published by RAU-publishers in Dusseldorf. Verband and the US Tobacco Institute would supply the basic information. A brief booklet for smokers and tobacco industry workers would deal with "anti-tobacco propaganda.”

"Like for all other stimulants and food -- it is the exaggeration which can be harmful.”

Assertion of hazards from passive smoking is "an exceptionally effective 'weapon'” in the hands of anti-tobacco forces, and needs to be countered. News releases, smokers' newsletter, etc. to be distributed through tobacconists shops (750,000 copies).

11. 24 October 1975, Paul Isenring (Philip Morris) speech to Managing Committee of Verband,

PM 2024965269 - 71, "'Smoking and Health' --The Industry Policy Today and in the Future.”

With anti-tobacco movement becoming more active in Europe ("Everywhere, there are heavy tax increases, in various countries based on the 'Smoking and Health' issue.”), led by WHO, the response from the European and German industry has been "silence,” as each company seeks only market shares, not a common, industry-wide policy. In particular, German manufacture of "lighter and lighter cigarettes...low in nicotine in smoke or nicotine free.... Do we really want to dig our own grave in this manner.” The threat is the destruction of the Tobacco Industry, prohibition of smoking. The important questions to be answered are:

1) Can the Industry, in Germany and in Europe, continue to keep silence or is it ready to work out a new policy which should consist in bring the fact of the scientific controversy with regard to "Smoking and Health” and to the importance of the industry in general, to the knowledge of the public, government, parliament?

2) In this context, the product policy regarding the low in nicotine smoke cigarettes and the nicotine free cigarettes may be reconsidered. This would be in the highest interest of the smokers -- our customers -- and therewith of our industry.

12. 24 October 1975, minutes of discussion following Isenring's presentation,

PM 2024965211 - 217. "Re: PR activity and "Smoking and Health.”

Discussants agree a public relations activity is needed (along the lines of the July 1975 proposal, item 10 above), at least to counter the statistics published by the Federal Government on 140,000 smoking-related deaths a year, and "DM 20 milliards as cost for social consequences.” Discussants were exercised about possible prohibition of smoking at work places, "especially dangerous as the sales would be severely affected through such a measure.” Chairman of the meeting, Mr. Dieter von Specht (of the BAT Cigarettenfabriken GmbH), suggested a Research Council be established to recommend to the German Industry what research should be funded. Despite the warnings by Isenring and PM/ Switzerland's Helmut Gaisch, von Specht declared that "The objective of the Research Council should be to support projects from which positive indications regarding a 'safer cigarette' could be expected.” Another point of contention was the Verband's desire to include Ernst Wynder (developer of the mouse-skin cancer assay and one of the early scientists to link smoking to lung cancer), on the Research Council. PM objected.

13. 24 February 1976, Colby Memo for the Record, RJR 50029-3555 - 56, "Conversation with Dr. Koenig of the Verband in Hamburg.” [Note: Harold Koenig was the Chief Administrative Officer of the Verband laboratory.]

Discussing a two-day symposium, the first to be dedicated to "biased” research, the second to the beneficial effects of smoking. "Even though I did not discuss this with Dr. Koenig, the obvious danger there to me could be a new emphasis on low tar and nicotine.”

14. 17 November 1976, Paul Isenring memo to several persons, PM 1002610069, "Germany -- Verband -- Research project "Beneficial Effects of Smoking.”

Isenring want s Verband to contact the Tobacco Institute, BAT-Germany, Philip Morris-Germany to coordinate with their US-based companies. Philip Morris could consider such a project and its approach.

15. 26 April 1977, memo from Colby to Edwin Jacob (Jacob & Medinger Law Firm), a hand-written translation from the German by Colby of the first two pages of a 20+ page Verband position paper on Smoking and Health.

The topics listed are: "Basic position of the [German] Cigarette Industry. Problem of "passive smoking.” The development of cigarettes offered in the German market. Reduction of condensate, gas phase, and plant protection agents. Does smoking of mild cigarettes lead to higher consumption? Advertising of tobacco products: Voluntary restrictions of advertising by the German Cigarette Industry. Warning labels on packages. The cigarette as entrance to drugs?”

The first chapter is translated:

The cigarette industry does not dispute the point that statistical studies conducted in the United States in the fifties indicate a statistical correlation between cigarette smoking and lung cancer. The cigarette industry also does not deny that tobacco smoke contains carcinogenic substances. However, animal experiments conducted in independent institutions throughout the world have shown that we are dealing here with relatively weak carcinogens. As a result, only very large doses of smoke condensate or tobacco smoke seemed to produce tumors on a small number of experimental animals. The doses were so large that, if conclusions from animal experiments can be transferred to man, they would correspond to completely unrealistic number of cigarettes.

16. 3 June [probably in 1977], Colby letter to Dieter von Specht (BAT Germany),

RJR 50028-1851 - 53, "Re: Verband (Adlkofer) Nicotine Research Concept.”

Colby presents numerous arguments, based on considerations of scientific experimental design, why Franz Adlkofer (Medical Research Director of the Verband-funded laboratory) should abandon plans to study nicotine effects on animals through inhalation. Colby notes that lawyers Ed Jacob and Wilfried Dembach had already spoken with Adlkofer on the subject. Adverse findings from such experiments might be used by "our adversaries.”

17. 22 June 1977, Colby memo to the record, RJR 50274-0064.

Colby decides not to provide additional funds to Verband, "We have been in disagreement with the whole program altogether.” Hopes to influence Philip Morris Europe to follow suit.

[NB. By about this time the Research Institute was formally dissolved, replaced by an "independent” laboratory funded by the German and transnational cigarette industry, with a Research Council used to approve research proposals coming from various scientists and institutions.]

18. 1 July 1977, Colby "Unedited Draft Notes,” RJR 50027-3956 - 58, "Some Thoughts On Selected Highlights of an Information System for the Verband der Deutschen Cigaretten Industrie Purpose.”

Colby notes are clearly meant to be addressed to the German tobacco industry, offering to build a scientific library in Germany similar to what he had built in the USA. He hopes other European manufacturers would help subsidize the effort. The purpose includes having appropriate literature to respond to attacks on the German cigarette industry in the area of smoking and health, but also to help the Research Council ("Forschungsrat”) evaluate research proposals, and to be abreast of cigarette technology and additives.

19. Approximately late 1977, Colby draft report to W. Dembach, RJR 502741197 - 1200.

Colby is concerned about several persons the Verband will appoint to the newly established German Tobacco Research Council. He is dead-set against a Prof. Schettler:

not a good scientist...his endorsement of margarine and the financial support he has enjoyed from the German margarine industry...endorsing some cardiovascular drugs without scientific justification but because he was 'subsidized' by the firm marketing such drugs...Schettler is vehemently anti-tobacco and interprets and often distorts any data in a manner which is as anti-smoking as possible.

Colby also against a Dr. Valentin because it came out that he was being financed by the tobacco industry when he spoke against bans on public smoking, although he had denied such payments at the time - it would provide ammunition to adversaries. Further, Dr. Adlkofer "has consistently shown poor judgment regarding scientific matters.” Especially as the new arrangement of Verband, the Research Council will be for Adlkofer to "dream up” the projects and the Council to "consent.” Colby insists RJR withhold financial support under such an arrangement. Colby feels it is unethical to pay Ernst Wynder to be on the Council. "Wynder is totally and uncompromisingly opposed to smoking and his advocacy of the 'less harmful cigarette' is only an intermediate step to weaning the smoker totally. The only 'useful' result which could come from such payments would be him reiterating his statements that the German cigarettes are the lightest cigarettes on the world market.”

Colby finally insists that Verband give "firms, including, of course, RJR” three months in which to approve a research project as per prior agreement [emphasis mine].

20. 8 July 1977, Colby trip Report Notes, RJR 51107-4355 - 57.

Colby uses a "confidant” within Verband to try convince Dieter von Specht "to affect the policies of the Verband regarding smoking and health.... to achieve a less compliant attitude toward the Government and anti-tobacco medical establishments in Germany.” He also obliquely criticizes continued support to Ernst Wynder to study bladder cancer [presumably as a result of smoking], Verband support of research on nicotine as a co-carcinogen, and on smokers' "compensation” [when smoking light cigarettes].

21. 29 November 1977, Colby memo to RJR in-house counsel H Roemer, RJR 50324-7230 - 40, "Contact with the German Cigarette Trade Association.”

Comments on his discussion with Franz Adlkofer (scientific director of the Verband- funded research laboratory) that while Adlkofer had "the ability to understand the scientific realities and the political background of the smoking and health controversy.... However, unfortunately, his convictions do not seem to last, and he is swayed easily and will not always stand up for his convictions.” Notes that Wynder's bladder cancer proposal was turned down "because R.J. Reynolds-Germany had protested against it.”

22. 22 March 1978, letter from Colby to Edwin Jacob of Jacob & Medinger, RJR 50028-1911,

"RE: Nitrosamines and sidestream smoke/Germany.”

Colby objects to continued Verband funding of a Dr. Hoffman ("of the Wynder group”) whose research on second-hand smoke was "not obtained under real life conditions,” and whose "unrealistic data will be quoted against us.” Adlkofer promises Hoffman will separately and personally present his future proposals to the German Industry scientists, with Colby in attendance.

23. 30 March 1978, Colby memo to RJR in-house counsel Samuel B. Witt, RJR 50094-4076, "ICOSI Working Group of the EC.”

Colby advises Witt that an ICOSI document [on public smoking] be explicit about why cigarette companies are producing low tar and nicotine cigarettes - a matter of competition, not to promise health benefits. If the German Industry does not change its "basic attitude,” Colby suggests strongly that RJR-Germany resign from the Verband.

24. 29 March 1978, Philip Morris's Paul Isenring memo to "Hoffman”, PM 2501025100, "ICOSI-Public Smoking Paper.”

Urges coordination and a "modus vivendi” between the two principal law firms representing the industry, Jacob & Medinger (RJR) and Shook, Hardy & Bacon (Philip Morris, Tobacco Institute and other US tobacco companies), and their involvement in European issues.

25. 21 April 1978, Isenring memo, PM 2501025098, "ICOSI - EEC Task Force on Consumerism.”

Speaks of need for coordinated industry response, coordinated by the two law firms, to the EEC Consumer Consultative Committee report on "The Tobacco [Industry] and the Health of the Consumer,” a strong attack against smoking.

26. 1 June 1978, Colby memo to Senior RJR Scientist Alan Rodgman, RJR 50088-5524, "Information for Dr. Laurene's weekly meeting with Mr. Hobbs.”

Alerts Rodgman to "Some potentially forthcoming changes in the smoking and health research policies of the German Cigarette Manufacturers Trade Association (Verband),” discussed with lawyers Dembach and Jacob.

27. 19 June 1978, Colby memo to RJR in-house counsel R.C. Roemer, RJR 50028-0584.

Wants himself and Ed Jacob to speak to Verband before they actually make the changes in their research policies.

28. 17 July 1978, Colby letter to Wilfried Dembach (RJR-Germany counsel), RJR 50028-1041.

I am planning to start a major file for future reference documenting the thesis that advertising does not sell cigarettes, but sells merely switching from one brand to another. Please send me all the material you have on this topic.... include whatever material may be available from the Verband. [NB. First indication of Colby moving off from his expertise as a chemist and scientist.]

29. 28 July 1978, abstract of publication, in German, from the Verband, "NOT TO BE GIVEN OUT WITHOUT FGC O.K.” RJR 51082-6747 - 48, "Some Definitions on the alleged carcinogenic and co-carcinogenic effects of tobacco smoke condensate.”

Definitions include primary carcinogens such as benz (a) pyrene, tumor-initiators or promoters such as dibenzanthracene and phenol, co-carcinogens that with another substance accelerate formation of tumors such as catechin. Anonymous author notes that no mechanism is known to distinguish a promotor from a co-carcinogen.

30. 3 August 1978, Colby memo to D.R. Piel, RJR 50088-5513, "Information for Dr. Laurene's
weekly meeting with Mr. Hobbs.”

At the confidential request of the German Cigarette Manufacturers Association, I have drafted a "Letter to the Editor” on behalf of a German scientist associated with the Verband responding to the recent paper by [Dr. W.] Aronow on passive smoking. Some informative material was sent to the Verband and other measures were undertaken in order to prevent them from organizing a symposium on carbon monoxide, which has a potentially damaging effect on our Industry.

31. 17 August 1978, memo from Colby to H Roemer (RJR in-house counsel), copies to outside legal counsels (Hoel, Jacob, Witt), RJR 50028-0787, "PR Committee Meeting Minutes -- Germany.”

Quotes Adlkofer's views on smoking and health controversy:

In considering the more recent publications of mortality statistics on lung cancer and heart attacks in the U.S.A., Great Britain and West Germany, as well as the studies by Hammond, Wald, and Wynder, one can come to the conclusion that the mild cigarette is not necessarily the answer, as frequently asserted, to the health risks related to smoking. Dr. Adlkofer's viewpoint much indicates a notion that a cigarette with a relatively high nicotine content and a low condensate content [i.e., tar] is the cigarette of the future.

32. 31 August 1978, Colby memo to Alan Rodgman, RJR 50088-5509, "Information for Dr. Laurene's weekly meeting with Mr. Hobbs.”

Comments on British Hunter Committee (Independent Scientific Committee on Smoking and Health) Report, its second on smoking and health, likely to be as critical of tobacco as the first, and urging Government regulation. Discusses "unpublished Wynder data” on alleged paradoxical epidemiological findings on smoking and cardiovascular disease, discussed with Dr. [Gary] Huber and the Verband.

33. 1 September 1978, Colby memo to H.C. Roemer, RJR 50364-7069, "German 'Compensation' Study.”

The study under Verband sponsorship will not be supported by RJR-Germany. Colby, Jacob, Dembach will discuss this study as "one of the topics” in the upcoming September 11 meeting with Verband's Dr.s Koenig and Adlkofer.

34. 3 October 1978, Colby memo to H. C. Roemer, RJR 50179-0036, "German Claims Alleging Filter Cigarettes Allegedly Less Safe Than Regular Cigarettes.”

I have just been informed that a sensationalist type German magazine called "Quick”, has published an interview with Prof. Schettler of Heidelberg University. In this interview Prof. Schettler alleges that smoking is the most "important” risk factor in cardiovascular diseases. He also alleges that the newer filter cigarettes are not "safe” either, but are, in effect, less so than the regular old style cigarettes.... One of the most noticeable facts about this story is that Prof. Schettler is the second most important research grantee (after Dr. Wynder) of the German Verband. I had tried unsuccessfully for years, repeatedly, to convince the German Industry that Prof. Schettler was a person not to be trusted and had even given them some information about some questionable dealings he allegedly has been involved in with the German drug industry. I also warned them that he was using the cigarette Industry as a scape-goat to bolster his integrity. The fact of being able to say "I told you so” provides slim satisfaction if weighed against the unfavorable effect such a blast must have on the German Industry as a whole.

35. 5 October 1978, Colby report H.C. Roemer, RJR 50324-7200 - 10, "Discussions with the Verband on their suggested nicotine research concepts.”

Colby reports on the September 11 meeting in London with Drs. Adlkofer and Koenig; attending were Ed Jacob, Dr. Charles Nystrom, Colby, and Dembach.

Mr. Jacob then proceeded to explain the dangers of nicotine research from the point of view of the Industry, with special reference to the threat of the American Industry being placed under the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration. He also mentioned that some work of the Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A. on nicotine "receptors” had to be terminated because of a possibility of such work being wrongly interpreted of having commercial implications. Dr. Koenig then claimed that he was aware of the specific problems of the American Industry supporting nicotine work in Germany through its German affiliates which could be alleged to be related to such problems as addiction. Dr. Koenig and Dr. Adlkofer then stated that in their judgment it was desirable to find out more about the effects, if any, of nicotine in laboratory animals on cancer, arteriosclerosis, pregnancy, etc. Mr. Jacob then state that under no circumstances would Reynolds support any research in Germany that we would or could not support in the U.S.... We then somewhat forcibly and -- deliberately -- overbearingly extracted from them an unequivocal promise that before any effort which was made to commence or in any other way start a specific research project, RJR -- like the other member Companies of the Verband -- would have a minimum of three months to evaluate each proposal.... Almost all of the meeting in London dealt with the legal perils and related aspects of the concepts on nicotine oriented research of the Verband.... I also tried to explain to Dr. Adlkofer and his associates why I considered the other "cornerstone” of his research concept, i.e. the so-called compensation study, scientifically totally worthless.

Colby goes on to suggest Adlkofer stick to basic research on human disease "alleged to be associated with tobacco, however, 'by definition,' such research would not deal with tobacco.

Colby then turns to the Chairman of the Research Council, a Prof. Schmael, who "a widely known expert in chemical cancerogenesis, "is receiving financial kickbacks from some of the current research grantees of the (Verband-financed) German Tobacco Research Council...for personal use.”

36. 8 December 1978, Colby memo to H.C. Roemer, RJR 50087-1996.

As an example of its "watergate” endeavors, the German Verband has made funds available to Dr. Wynder for his American Health Foundation [in New York City], to be the front in financing a Symposium on carbon monoxide,held in Berlin in October ('78) .

37. 6 February 1979, Report by A.W.M. St. Aubyn to Philip Morris, PM 2501159601 - 607, "Visit to Verband der Cigaretten-Industrie, Hamburg, 30th and 31st January 1979.”

A comprehensive review of the Verband activities: statistical analyses of cigarettes and consumption; public relations and responses to attack, "at arms length;” publications and films for the public and health professionals, comparing all risks to health, seeking to be positive, not offensive, to maintain the social acceptability of smoking. One paragraph stands out:

Risks. The type of clandestine operations in which the VdC is involved clearly carry certain risks of detection, by such people as investigative journalists, of the link between the industry and the end product. HK [Harold Koenig] believes that the precautions they take are sufficient to enable the industry to be able to deny any link and says that such risks as remain are acceptable to the VdC member companies.

38. 26 March 1979, Letter from W. Dembach to Dr. E.B. Brueckner, Research Society on Smoking and Health, RJR 50092-4525. Copies to Dr. B. Pelz (RJR-Germany) and Colby.

Letter advances RJR payments for research projects invoiced but notes that RJR is only paying for projects it has already approved, not new projects not yet reviewed.

39. 12, 19 April 1979, Colby memo to Alan Rodgman, RJR 50162-7697 - 700, "Information for Dr. Laurene's weekly meeting with Mr. Hobbs.

This is one of the few "attorney-client privileged” documents additionally heavily censored ("privileged material redacted”). A hand-written cover sheet reads "Please read & destroy without making copies.”

Surprisingly, the Verband had decided to invite Dr. Gori, apparently without checking ahead of time with the member firms, more specifically with RJR-GmbH.... Dr. Gori "buttonholed” me a the Verband meeting and asked me point blank whether "I agreed that the German Tobacco Industry is sponsoring research which would not be permitted by your lawyers in the United States.” I thought it futile to deny the obvious or to reply that I could not comment. I stated therefore that we only had a very small market share in Germany and that our influence was therefore limited. (Confidential).

[Gori was employed at the National Institutes of Health, heading up the smoking and health program; he sought for years to develop a "safe” cigarette.]

40. 23 May 1979, Colby memo to Alan Rodgman, RJR 50088-5452 - 53, "Information for Dr. Laurene's weekly meeting with Mr. Hobbs.”

Colby attended the Scientific Technical Advisory Group of ICOSI in Brussels, and provided "intelligence” on Philip Morris/Europe, BAT, and Imperial.

PM/E has had for several years, as a wholly owned subsidiary, a major commercial research institute in Cologne/Germany, which does animal and other biological research. PM/E has completed a study on analyses of cigarette, respectively filter tip, stubs, comparing tar/nicotine intake of cigarettes about twenty years ago, i.e. mostly non-filter cigarettes having high nicotine/tar deliveries, vs. Recent cigarettes, i.e. mostly filter cigarettes having high nicotine/tar deliverers. The results allegedly show that there is no substantial difference in nicotine intake by Swiss smokers as a whole... [I] can not make a judgment how valid the PM conclusion is that there is "compensation.”

[In the same memo Colby noted the retirement from BAT of senior scientist Dr. Green, soon to be a whistle-blower.]

41. 20 July 1979, Colby letter to Dembach, RJR 50092-0451 - 53, "Re: Verband Executive Meeting, June 26, 1979.”

Colby comments on a paper Verband intends to send to the German Medical Weekly. "I find especially the comments preceding the actual report on the...reference to alleged adverse health effects of smoking, as well as the references to the 'less harmful cigarettes', scientifically unacceptable and politically unpalatable.” Colby also objects to Verband research on polycyclic hydrocarbons and electrostatic precipitation of cigarette smoke - particularly because adversaries would "manipulate” the methodology and information.

42. 2 August 1979, Colby memo to RJR in-house counsel S.B. Witt, RJR 50324-7017, "Verband grantees.”

Colby complains of the Verband report, "Research grantees,” where "some comments which wrongly allege that cigarette smoking is harmful.”

43. 5 August 1979, Colby letter to Dembach, RJR 5087-2449.

Colby likes a Prof. Krokowski's "open-minded attitude towards smoking for years,” and notes that he is "the first good potential candidate to serve as 'witness'.” [NB. Colby was the first to develop a method of recruiting "friendly” scientists and medical doctors by careful screening. The method was formalized a decade later in the Asian ETS Consultant Project, among other such programs to find friendly witnesses for litigation and testimony at legislatures.]

44. 29 August 1979, Colby memo to Alan Rodgman, RJR 50162-7508, "Monthly status report.”

Among other activities, "Obtained confidential information on the relationship between the British Tobacco Industry and the Hunter Committee.”

45. 5 September 1979, Colby draft memo to RJR in-house counsel S.B. Witt,

RJR 500950146-48, "RJRTI funding of smoking and health research in Germany and elsewhere.”

$750,000 over three years. Purpose of research is to fund "impeccable” smoking and health research, find "witnesses”, give RJR a leadership role in other countries as in the United States. Current research projects funded by the Verband are by scientists hostile to the Tobacco Industry and "Obviously, 'politically' such data are doubly damaging if financed by the industry....

Funding 'impeccable' research also means to exclude not only researchers prejudiced against the Tobacco Industry, it equally means not to fund scientists which might be tempted to prejudice their findings to please the Industry.... It must, therefore, be stated most emphatically that projects funded by RJR may yield data which we do not like.”

46. 14 September 1979, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50324-6989 - 11, "Verband Smoking and Health Research Grant Procedures.”

Colby outlines the grant making procedures of the Verband, "adopted over our objections”:

1) There will be projects submitted by, or solicited from various university and research institute scientists. These will be evaluated as to their scientific merit by the new German Tobacco Research Council (see below). However, the Executive Board of the Verband reserves itself the right to veto or otherwise control publication.

2) The Verband, i.e. Adlkofer and company, will originate other projects and choose their researchers within Germany and, possibly, also outside Germany, in a form akin to what we call in this country "contract research.” For this type of project the Verband plans also to reserve itself the right to veto or otherwise control publication.

Chiefly due to Ed's [Jacob], Wilfried's [Dembach], and my initiatives, the Verband has agreed that all member companies will have three months to comment, before any irrevocable commitments are made. (I am, however, skeptical whether the Verband will always be scrupulous in observing this.) Any company has the right to withhold its funding from any project. Similarly, there seems to be an unwritten understanding that any member company may veto any of the projects.... The Verband has asked approval of a specific research proposal ("Effect of carbon monoxide and nicotine on minipigs”), which in the judgment of Dr. Pelz and myself, is totally ill conceived. Also, nearly all the scientists of the other firms are against this project.

Colby also objected to some appointees to the Research Council, "personal friends of Dr. Adlkofer.”

47. 19 September 1979, Colby memo to S.B. Witt - includes portions of 5 September memo (item 45), RJR 50087-7333 - 42, "RJRTI Financed Smoking and Health Research in Germany to Date -- 1977-79.”

Colby describes the kind of research RJR has funded: 1) Whether lung cancer and/or smoking are associated with a person's psychological makeup, war experiences, religion, etc. $200,000 annually. 2) Whether the handwriting of lung cancer patients can reveal characteristics associated with lung cancer. $18,000. 3) Enzyme markers in human cells predicting susceptibility to lung cancer. "The CTR-USA and other organizations have spent millions of dollars on this concept.... Results to date have been disappointing and the original concept is now very much in question.” 4) Toxicologically caused cancer "threshold” theory. "Incomplete results to date -- involving chemicals in no way related to tobacco -- have not turned out as hoped for.” $110,000.

5) Epidemiologic study of total Cancer rates in Hamburg, corrected for shift in population and improved diagnoses, have not changed, but locations of cancer have [Colby doesn't specify!]. $25,000. 6) Comparison of "annoyance” from second-hand smoke to other industrial odors. $35,000. 7) Dr. Neubert's studies on [voluntarily] aborted fetuses from smoking and non-smoking women. Obstacle to study is a change in voluntary abortion methods. Neubert proposes going to animal models. [NB. A search of the 39,000 attorney-client privileged documents turns up many references to these studies and will be investigated separately.] $48,000. 8) Chain smoking Prof. Staecker believes extroversion causes both smoking and "certain respiratory patterns.” $58,000.

48. 24 September 1979, Colby memo to Dembach and Bernd F. Pelz [NB. Pelz was RJR- Germany scientist assigned to keep track of Verband deliberations and operations, see RJR 50087738.], RJR 50092452 - 23, "Verband Research Projects Approval.”

Colby confirms the Verband procedures as outlined to S.B. Witt 14 September 1979 (item 46). Emphasizes need for close RJR review of ALL proposed projects (not just those, apparently, funded by RJR). "These projects need not only be assessed from a purely scientific point of view, but also from a legal point of view (i.e. Sam Witt, ed Jacob, etc.).

49. 5 October 1979, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50324-6995 - 96, "Verband Research Project -- Umbilical Cords Pathology.”

Colby writes, "The Verband is planning to undertake a new research project which is described in the attachment. I am planning to advise Wilfried Dembach and Bernd Pelz as follows, provided you approve.” He objects not to the research (ostensibly looking at cords of infants delivered to smoking and non-smoking mothers) but to the researchers who have been associated with or published research on pregnancy and smoking or on minipigs, "which are mostly very anti-smoking,” and "a serious embarrassment to the German Industry.”

50. 19 November 1979, memo from Bernd Pelz to W. Dembach, RJR 50087-7295 - 98, "VdC-Tabakforschungsausschuss (TFA)-Meeting.” [Verband Tobacco Research Committee.]

First of a number of reports by Pelz, assigned to report on the Verband research deliberations. The TFA became the successor to the Forschungsrat (Research Council). The researchers discussed the need to "do something about nitrosamines in smoke.” Pelz reports, "Heavy metals in smoke. This discussion I regard a personal victory: there will be no research follow-up by the Verband on the publication by Prof. Mueller on Cadmium in tobacco.”

51. 21 November 1979, Edwin Jacob memorandum to files, PM 100012218 - 22, "Meeting With Executive Board of Verband re Research Structure November 13, 1979.”

I had referred to the statement of research concept agreed with Konig [Dieter Koenig] during our meetings last year...and changes were made in the draft statute for the Research Council, as follows: I) References to product development or improvement were eliminated from the statute. ii) No scientific approval of the Verband or members of the Industry will be required for specific research projects. iii) There will be no requirement that the Council make recommendations with regard to product improvement.... Part of the problem [how to engage company scientists in the Council review of projects] might be in asking the wrong question. It is not helpful to obtain negative reaction of the scientists and then go forward on political grounds. It might be more helpful to tell the scientists that a political decision to do a project has been made and invite their cooperation in making it as effective as possible, given whatever the political parameters might be.

52. 28 November 1979, Richard Marcotullio (RJR "Managerial Employee”), memorandum to file, RJR 50212-2792 - 97, "ICOSI International Public Smoking Symposium.”

Long soliloquy about a major conference whose industry sponsorship the Verband wanted kept secret, otherwise it "would preclude the ability to attract the participants desired,” that is, the best scientists, as well as the expected participation of the World Health Organization. Marcotullio and others were of the opinion that this should be an industry show, not a venue for scientific or legal debate or controversy. If anything, the pressure on individuals to stop smoking ought to be raised as "debate” with the intention of "discrediting the other side.” Therefore, only participants siding with the industry should be on the program, "producing testimony and a report which can be used with legislators.” The three aims of the symposium would be to produce a useable book, provide media coverage ("highly organized”), and to "neutralize WHO as best as possible on the public smoking issue. [NB. The conveners of the conference is an organization coded as "IO.” I do not know what this stands for.]

Of interest in this memo is the close coordination with law firm principals, such as Mary Covington of Covington & Burling, Don Hoel and Charles Tucker from Shook, Hardy & Bacon ("Kansas City”); and the major manufacturers BAT, Imperial, Philip Morris, and RJR.

53. 30 November 1979, Colby memo to Pelz, RJR 50324-7368, "Adams 'Compensation'.”

[NB. "Compensation” refers to smokers of low tar, low nicotine cigarettes inhaling more deeply and longer to get the requisite amount of nicotine their bodies demand.]

For reference I attach two recent papers by Dr. Adams. As I am sure you are aware, the "politics” of Imperial "demand” that there is no compensation. The Verband's politics have changed radically in that the late Dr. Weber insisted that there was no compensation, but now Dr. Adlkofer wants to show compensation. In my judgment, as regards the majority of convinced smokers, there is compensation ...[but] is only partial over the long run...from the point of the smoking and health controversy...this is probably meaningless. This is because there is no way of determining the smoking behavior changes -- if any -- of the very small number of smokers who may or may not be "at risk” with regards to diseases allegedly associated with smoking.

54. 6 December 1979, Colby to S.B. Witt, RJR 50087-7291 - 94, the Research Council for Smoking and Health and Verband "Statute” and declarations of purpose, in German (undated) and partially translated to English.

[NB. The English translation of the Purpose of the Research Council is totally redacted from this document.]

In rough translation [mine], the statute declares that the purpose of the Research Council is to discover, on the basis of present knowledge, if or how nicotine, alone or interacting with other substances, takes part in the pathogenesis of chronic illnesses associated with smoking. Because of the importance and extent of this area of work [smoking and health], nicotine research

is at the center of the activities of the Research Council. Basic research will take suitable note of and be based on clinical studies. In certain instances work with other scientific disciplines will give meaning to the results.

55. 13 December 1979, Meeting notes from Bernd Pelz distributed to Colby, Dembach, Alan Rodgman, H.J. Weder, S.B. Witt, RJR 50092-0366 - 72, "VdC Scientific Committee (TFA) Meeting, Hamburg Dec. 12, 79.” [NB. TFA stands for Tabak Forschungs Ausschuss, tobacco research committee.]

Scientists at the meeting represented BAT, British Imperial, Philip Morris, Reemtsma, RJR, VdC, and Austria Tabakwerke.

A paper on nitrosamine levels in many brands of cigarettes from different nations was published by Drs. Ruhl, Adams, Hoffman in a reputable but Verband financed German scientific journal ("Beitrage...”). It was felt "not what one would like to see” but an attempt by the Verband to suppress it would be undesirable given the cooperation of the German Federal Health Office in the study. The Reemtsma representative objected, however. The same Dr. Adams continues to show compensation behavior of "light” cigarette smokers. Pelz then related a discussion about the Verband with two company scientists (Austria Tabakwerke and PM) on the way to the airport. "They both said that approval of Verband research was more or less based on a general judgement as to what potential harm a piece of research could do.” Pelz's own role in insisting on more information about research protocols, they warned, could lead him to be marginalized. Both scientists said appointment of Adlkofer to head the Scientific Committee was a mistake "because this would add too much influence to the Verband. They would also prefer to have the chairmanship in the hands of members of industry.”

56. 17 December 1979, Marcotullio memorandum to the file, RJR 50212-2771 - 78, ICOSI - International Public Smoking Symposium.”

Continued soliloquy, with an apparent change of heart by the ICOSI at a 12 December meeting attended by writer, and law firm principals Ed Jacob and Charles Tucker. "The WHO Sub-director [Mr. Tibblen] has apparently been offered by the proposed public sponsor of the symposium, the 'JO', and the 'IO' has apparently indicated that while the sub-director will not be totally on our side his remarks will be fairly moderate. It was also felt that this would add to the credibility of the symposium in that it would not be totally one-sided.... Controlled controversy rather than balanced controversy.... The Verband has full control over the 'IO,' Resulting from a long history of cooperation between the Verband and the 'IO'.... Trevor King of Imperial Tobacco expressed his concern that WHO was being asked to be a party to a 'balanced' conference' where its views were then going to be discredited. He further questioned why the 'IO” would want to put itself in this position and [Christian] Vogel [of ICOSI] responded that 'it's a question of who is the biggest supporter of the IO.' Julian Doyle then commented that the 'IO' was apparently chosen because of its relationship with WHO.”

Further discussion of how to organize the symposium centered on whether IO/ICOSI should act as the convener with secretive funding to come through the Verband. The Americans (industry and lawyers) objected because of the possibility of discovery, the Europeans refused a symposium where industry sponsorship was openly known. The circuitous solution was for Verband to support IO sponsorship, with other and more neutral sponsors also sought, and the industry role in sponsorship not be proclaimed but not denied either if asked [a variant "don't ask, don't tell” policy.].

57. 20 December 1979, Colby letter to Jacob, 50087-2965, commenting on Pelz's report of
13 December (item 55).

Company scientists don't understand "that most of the research funding by the Verband will not be funneled through the Research Council, "but directly via contract research.” Colby still insists on a three-month review period by RJR (and other firms) of all research proposals.

58. 10 January 1980, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50088-2843 - 45, " Smoking and Health and Related Activities for Germany, etc.”

Job description for Bernd Pelz. Essentially to "monitor and assess any and all activities of the Verband:” scientific, legislative, court testimony, support of scientific meetings, contacts with researchers outside Germany, contacts with tobacco trade associations and tobacco companies outside Germany. Colby notes two kinds of funded research - Verband support of projects cleared by the Research Council, which require limited monitoring "provided they stick to their agreements,” and contracts funded by tobacco companies directly, which require more extensive review with three months notice.

59. 10 January 1980, Colby memo to Dembach, RJR 50088-2850, "Verband research on smoking motivation by Bergler.”

Verband commissioned research on the role of advertising "is obviously a sensitive topic and in my judgment, it falls under the subjects where there should be some input from Winston-Salem, before any commitments by RJR are made.”

60. 14 January 1980, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50285-6873, "False allegations made by German semi-official Health Insurance.”

The Dusseldorf branch of the semi-official German Health Insurance, which insures about 70% of all West Germans, made the following false allegations: 1. "There is a cause and effect relationship between cigarette smoking and various diseases.”

2. Tobacco advertising induces children and young people to smoke.” 3."Smokers are insufficiently informed regarding the effect of smoking on health.” The Verband has replied over the signature of Mr. von Specht regarding point 1. That "risk factors” are not synonymous with causation, and that relationships between smoking and health are a matter of controversy.... Regarding point 2, the Verband stated that not a single study backs up the insurance's claim.... Regarding point 3, it was pointed out that all press, radio and TV polls have come to contrary conclusions.

61. 18 January 1980, Colby draft of memo to S.B. Witt ("no copies”), RJR 50088-2851 - 55, "Smoking and Health in Germany.”

Suggestion that all is not well with Colby who complains of not being informed on all issues and by all meeting minutes, whether from the Verband Tobacco Committee (TA, a technical group comprising one R&D scientist from each company), the Tobacco Research Committee (TFA, the policy level committee headed by Dr. Adlkofer), and the Executive Board (made up of CEO's of each of the member companies or their delegates, who scrutinize all research proposals). Colby still strongly objects to nicotine and compensation studies, which appear to be going ahead despite his protests.

62. 25 February 1980, Richard Marcotullio memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50212-2978 - 79, "Germany -- Legal action against Reemstma.”

Advises that the leading anti-smoking group in Germany, Physicians Working Group on Smoking and Health (led by Professor Schmidt) is suing Reemstma for using posters with a young, healthy model advertising "Brand X”, suggesting no ill-effect from smoking in contravention of the German Food Law. The case is being taken by an avowed anti-smoking judge, whose wife is also a judge and a "paranoid” anti-smoker. Another lawsuit is being instituted by a long-time smoker (smoking the same "Brand X”) who suffered a heart attack and was told by his physician that smoking was the cause.

63. 6 March 1980, Colby memorandum for the record, RJR 51146 - 8214 - 15, " Re: Meeting with Dr. Adlkofer, March 6, 1980 in Houston, TX.”

Colby quotes Adlkofer as saying that he believed "risk factors were more or less synonymous with causation.” Colby relates further, "In the sum he believes that smoking 'causes' lung cancer, heart disease.... He also believes that low 'tar' low-nicotine cigarettes are less harmful.”

64. 14 March 1980, Colby letter to Dembach, RJR 50433-9741.

To the best of my information, lung cancer has been increasing in German fairly steeply between 1955 and the present. All this does not jibe with German cigarette consumption. For example, between 1933 and World War II, German cigarette consumption had been increasing. However, during World War II, there was a very marked dip in consumption, due to lack of tobacco; then, consumption has been increasing during the first few years after World War II, but from then on it has allegedly been decreasing, especially if viewed in terms of "tar”/nicotine contents. Even making the most generous allowances for lag time, these two sets of data can not be reconciled. In my judgment, this is one of many examples that show that the allegations of a causal association between smoking and lung cancer cannot be reconciled with the facts.

Colby then asks Dembach to get Verband data on consumption, and cancer data from the Government.

65. 18 March 1980, Dembach letter to Edwin Jacob, RJR 50274-2741.

Advises that a Verband publication, "Tobacco Booklet” is ready, to be distributed to employees only, that he succeeded "95%” in promoting a "less risky version. If however, extremely delicate things are hidden in the booklet, please tell this to Sam (Witt) and Frank (Colby) who will then decide together with me what to do.”

66. 27 March 1980, Pelz meeting notes to Dembach, RJR 50154-5782 - 84, "VdC scientific Committee (TFA) Meeting, Hamburg March 26, 1980.”

Pelz reports that Adlkofer "one way or another managed to have Dr. Hoffman withdraw his publication on nitrosamines in the smoke of German cigarettes. He is now said to publish in the 'Lebensmittelchemis' Journal which will have a much larger readership than Beitrage, but obviously is not edited by tobacco industry.”

67. 10 April 1980, Colby letter to H.C. Roemer (in-house counsel), RJR 51238-4899 - 900.

Colby reports on the progress of various German researches: the "annoyance” study, the chemical threshold of cancer causing agents study. Colby wishes to discuss continued funding on the latter to a Dr. Henschler, one of the foremost German and International scientists, especially in the area of toxicology. Dr. Henschler has been extremely helpful in the past...in aiding us to best achieve our two objectives of funding impeccable smoking and health related research by open-minded scientists and to assist our German company and RJRTI in Europe in general, to assume in other countries a similar industry leadership role as in the United States.

Colby discusses a Prof. Oeser, University of Berlin, who says that while overall cancer incidence in Germany has remained stable, lung cancer may be an exception; "he alleges that smoking is probably one of the principal causes of lung cancer. The purpose of my visit [to him] will be to try to sway him -- or at least induce him to give this matter a great deal of further thought.”

68. 2 June 1980, Pelz meeting notes report to Dembach, RJR 50092-6108 - 09, "Scientific meeting of the VdC (TFA), June 2, 1980.”

With representatives of the German Federal Health Office in attendance, reports were given by two invited researchers on nitrosamines - one indicating that it was a cancer risk factor in smoking (perhaps in combination with diet) and suggesting that cigarettes should have polycyclic aromatics, phenols and amines removed. The second scientist noted that "tobacco smoke is the biggest source of exogenous nitrosamines...the most versatile chemical carcinogens.”

After the presentations, Dr. Fink of Philip Morris abstained from the discussion and Pelz withdrew. "The entire spectacle had been arranged in an attempt to show to the guests that Industry was concerned, that it was the Verband who could save Industry and to maneuver industry into an at least moral bind to do something.”

69. 12 June 1980, Colby trip report to Timothy M. Finnegan (law partner in Jacob, Medinger and Finnegan), P.M. Schuler, Dembach (counsels), and Marcotullio, RJR 50094-9802 - 04, RJR 50482-1197 - 1200, RJR 50094-9809 - 10, "Visits to German Research Grantees, Potential Grantees, and Related Contacts.”

Colby reports on ongoing projects mentioned in earlier reports. The previous three months required review time for all project approvals is now given as six months. Colby notes that Prof. Jacob of Heidelberg gave the keynote address at the Anti-Smoking World Health Day -- and Jacob believes smoking causes lung cancer -- he had sent the draft of the speech to RJR-Germany, and that changes were made! "He was very unpleasantly surprised by the biased and one-sided interpretation of his remarks” by the media.

70. 26 September 1980, Colby report to S.B.Witt, RJR 50482-1184 - 91, "Smoking and Health Research Projects in Germany.”

Colby describes "special projects,” ones which are contracted and handled by the Verband but have been kept confidential from the old Research Council and the new Research Council. [NB. Probably means the TFA, tobacco research committee.]

The Verband has total control over the design of the experiments, the right of the researchers to publish.... These projects likewise need to be kept confidential to the outside (including CTR) excepting those having a 'need to know' within RJR, Philip Morris, Jacob & Medinger, and Shook/Hardy. These are the projects where we try...to achieve some consensus between Philip Morris and us.... Incidentally, I may have opened a somewhat better line of communication with PM on such projects, by talking directly to Dr. Tom Osdene (Alan Rodgman's equivalent at PM) and/or Alex Holtzman.

The "special” and "confidential” projects included the following: 1. Co-carcinogenesis of nicotine (Colby deems the study poor and not publishable even though "a slight increase in carcinogenesis has allegedly been observed,” with statistical significance measured by Peter N. Lee "at best very limited”); 2. Determination of nitrosamines in sidestream smoke, reproducing earlier findings (Colby dismisses the results); 3. Presence of other mutagens in sidestream smoke (Adlkofer wants this study published, Colby and Pelz and PM opposed); 4. Compensation by smokers who switch to low tar-low nicotine cigarettes to achieve previous levels of intake (Colby is "adamantly opposed to this project on general principles” although Adlkofer, contrary to his earlier view, now wants to prove compensation exists). Ten other studies are mentioned, nearly all considered "worthless” or without "usable data” or "minor effects” or "questionable techniques” or "non- publishable” or "meaningless.” The only study seemingly of merit is one showing that smokers make more sperm than non-smokers.

Colby spends many words criticizing the planned compensation study by Dr. Schievelbein. "The full study and the preliminary study are 'watergated' with reference to purpose and grantor.... The study is represented to be dealing with fat metabolism and its alleged effect on cardiovascular parameters.” [NB. Colby has used the term "watergated” at least once before to mean hiding data or a study.]

71. 26 September 1980, Colby memo to Max H. Crohn (RJR in-house counsel), RJR 50326-2709, "Re: Public Smoking.”

I have been informed on a confidential basis that there is a reasonable expectation for me to receive a paper by Dr. WYNDER, condemning the scientific validity of the White and Froeb study.... In all probability I will have the discretion to pass on this document to the Tobacco Institute for use as they may see fit, prior to the California Referendum. Confidential reliable information has been obtained that the chief expert of the German Government in the area of public smoking, a very well known Professor of the Free University of Berlin, also has written a paper, similarly condemning the scientific validity of the White and Froeb study, in response to inquiries from the German Parliament.... I am urging the German Industry Association to use their influence to have this inquiry and response expedited so that it would be used prior to the California Referendum.

[NB. The paper by James R. White and Herman F. Froeb appeared in the New England Journal of Medicine in the spring of 1980, demonstrating that nonsmokers working in smoky offices had abnormalities of lung function similar to those seen in moderate smokers. White had been a major supporter of California Proposition 5 in 1978, which failed, and the upcoming Proposition 10, which subsequently also failed on the November 4 ballot. These propositions meant to restrict smoking in public places, restaurants and workplaces. The industry mounted fierce opposition through its front organization, Californians against Regulatory Excess (CARE). Letters of criticism of the paper written to the New England Journal of Medicine were similarly orchestrated, with authors like Gary Huber, Allan Freedman, Domingo Aviado whose paid links to the industry were not disclosed. Franz Adlkofer also wrote a letter, though Colby had tried to discourage his - see RJR 50482-1199 - on the grounds that letters from persons not affiliated with the industry had already been submitted. See Stanton Glantz, et al. The Cigarette Papers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 428-30.]

72. 29 September 1980, Colby memo to S.B.Witt, RJR 50324-6621, "Tobacco Industry Sponsored Smoking and Health Research in Switzerland.”

Comments on the "political” conditions in Switzerland, different from those in Germany, with respect to industry funding, so that researchers are quite independent. Nonetheless, Colby recommends the same basic structure as in Germany of funding and approval by tobacco companies through their Swiss Association.

73. 6 October 1980, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50088-2657 - 60, "Meeting with Dr. Herbert Bentley of Imperial Tobacco Ltd. Bristol/England -- September 9, 1980.”

Bentley, once head of Imperial's R&D, is identified as the "No. 2 man at Imperial,.” second to Andy Reed. Colby discusses with Bentley "the basic political attitude of the British Industry management vis-a-vis their Government,” and Bentley agrees, echoing Reed, that a firmer stance was needed. Colby notes,

The Industry has decided to stand firm against the Government's demands on extreme control and/or reduction in advertising. The Industry believes that the Health Minister's Sir George Young's, extremist anti-tobacco industry stance will "in a crunch” not be backed by Margaret Thatcher who, according to "inside information”, is for the Industry.

Colby urged the British industry not accede to or cooperate with the Hunter Committee demand that the Industry research "safer” cigarettes, and he pointed to the way the Verband had proceeded with its own Research Council [NB. Colby refers to a 26 September memo to Witt on this, which has not yet turned up.] . Colby then passes on various bits of gossip, how Geoff Folton of BAT had been sidelined because he sided with S.J. Greene, head of BAT R&D who turned against the industry; Folton had called Colby a member of the "flat earth society.” And Colby says of long-time Industry statistical consultant Peter N. Lee, "Peter was not only largely in agreement with the anti-smoking views of the British medical Establishment, such as Sir Richard Doll, but in addition to that, was from a technical point of view, not a very competent statistician.” The Verband had recently hired Lee as their consultant.

74. 10 October 1980, Pelz meeting notes, RJR 50154-5704 - 06, "Scientific Committee Meeting of the VdC (TFA), October 30, 1980.”

Among other items, a discussion of whether BAT would do experiments on nitrous oxides in exhaled smoke at the Southampton.

75. 18 December 1980, Colby trip report, RJR 50094-9787 - 91, "Trip to Germany, Switzerland and Great Britain on Smoking and Health, December 1980.”

He sits in on the Verband TFA meeting as an "auditor,” and criticizes the way Adlkofer runs the meeting. "It is, in my judgment, necessary to try find a way to remedy this. He also objects again to the compensation study. "In my judgment, however, it is imperative that the Verband receives unequivocal directives from the Executive Committee (composed of Mr. Fischer, Mr. von Specht (BAT-Germany), and other chief executives of the participating companies), not to make any commitment -- financially or otherwise -- on the full study, until ALL the results of the preliminary study can be assessed by the company scientists, for a minimum of about two months.” Colby meets with a Dr. Harke, who had done studies on public smoking when with the Verband Research Institute, but who was treated "rather shabbily when the Institute was dissolved. Since Dr. Harke is a potential witness on public smoking, I have made a -- I believe -- successful effort to cultivate his friendship, by inviting him to lunch or dinner about once a year.”

76. 15 January 1981, Pelz meeting notes, RJR 50266-4311 - 12, "Scientific Committee Meeting of the VdC (TFA), January 15, 1981.”

Discusses proposed studies on polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in smoke, and findings that non-smokers had higher nitrosamine levels in the urine. "In a mouse skin experiment [by Dr. Brune], polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons were shown to have no effect. The committee agreed that the VdC should not press for a publication of results because this might stimulate the researchers to search for other culprits.”

77. 12 February 1981, Report by Philip Morris scientist R.B. Seligman, PM 2000515457 - 62, "Surgeon General's Report - Response.”

Discussing Industry responses to anti-smoking attacks,

Attempts in individual countries, e.g., CTR, TAC [UK], and the Verband unfortunately have tended to respond to issues nationally rather than internationally. This becomes increasingly ineffective when many of the attacks now are coming from international bodies like WHO, etc. Response must be global in concept because adverse reports from any country immediately have worldwide impact (viz.; -- Hirayama, Froeb/White, etc.). Thus, a major requirement would be to establish an international order or priorities because of the aforementioned synergistic and interactive effect of today's rapid communications.

Seligman proposes a number of research studies to consider as part of the worldwide response: sidestream smoke, repeating the White/Froeb study; exploring the benefits of smoking; developing products "which are of low biologic potential;” reducing carbon monoxide; developing a "product with low ignition propensity”; and discussing a "reasoned approach” to additives with the Surgeon General. The last "may be of particular importance in the far distant future when we may contemplate the use of other nicotinoids or non-nicotinoics as flavorings, etc.

In conclusion, let us say that we are mindful of the potential risks inherent in conducting the proposed extramural studies. Perhaps, as scientists, our view of risk/benefit has been distorted by trying to do battle without armament. We feel, however, that the thrust of our antagonists' position has been refocused to the non-smoker. Perhaps we should reassess our own risk/reward posture in this light.

78. 20 February 1981, meeting notes by O. Stuhl (assisting Bernd Pelz from RJR-Germany) to Dembach, RJR 50266-4285, second page only.

Having attended the TFA meeting for the first time, I want to summarize some personal observations: 1. The general attitude of the VdC and other TFA members (except RJR) appears to be resignation vis-a-vis the anti/passive smoking issues. The willingness to even think offensively to me appeared to be rather limited. 2. Prof. Adlkofer exhibited a very authoritarian attitude in chairing the meeting, strangling discussions and avoiding decisions. His "soft handling” of "hot items” to me appeared to be more paralyzing than catalyzing. 3. Also I do not share Prof. Adlkofer's opinion that about 90 per cent of the medical profession do believe in anti-smoking publications.

79. 19 February 1981 Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50368-1457 - 57, "Confidential.”

In meetings with Dr. Adlkofer and Dr. Koerner of the Verband, discusses prospective visit by Adlkofer and Peter Lee to Dr. Hirayama in Japan. [NB. Takashi Hirayama published in the British Medical Journal in 1980 the first major study showing increased lung cancer in non-smoking wives of smoking men. Another study about the same time was published from Greece by Trichopoulos in the International Journal of Cancer.]

Also discussed a possible symposium in Germany on public smoking. "The basic concept of the meeting would be to invite well known scientists who, as far, as the alleged effect of smoking on smokers is concerned, are not generally on our side, but who, on the other hand, agree with us regarding the lack of allegedly disease causing effects of smoking on non-smokers. In other words, this would include people like Drs. Wynder, Hammond and Garfinkel, and others.”

[NB. Lawrence Garfinkel was vice-president for epidemiology of the American Cancer Society. His 1981 paper in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute showed equivocal results on second-hand smoke causing lung cancer, but in 1985 confirmed Hirayama's premise with his second study in the JNCI. See Glantz, Cigarette Papers, 351.]

"Towards the end of our conversation...I had a very successful -- though delicate-- discussion with Prof. Adlkofer on behalf of RJRTI on a matter which must remain confidential at this time.”

80. 23 February 1981, Colby memo to Dembach, RJR 51101-8345, "A's Hamburg statement on lung cancer - Conversation with him on February 16, 1981 in New York.”

Adlkofer, referred to as "A” throughout the memo, is chastised by Colby in Ed Jacob's office for a statement Adlkofer made to the Verband's Executive Committee to the effect that "Smoking is the essential causal factor for lung cancer in addition to other factors,” in the context of a discussion of Hirayama's paper. Adlkofer indicated that while the American industry should worry about litigation, this was not a problem for Germany "for any time in the future.” Colby then suggested strongly that Adlkofer stay on as secretary of the Forschungsrat [meaning the TFA] but give up his position as scientific director of the Verband. Adlkofer's position was, in Colby's view, incompatible with being scientific c director. Colby intimates that this idea has support at top RJR levels.

81. 27 February 1981, Colby secret memo to Dembach, RJR 50092-4216 - 17.

Colby disturbed by the Research Committee intended to advise the industry on manufacture of its tobacco products, as well as Verband's intention to reach out to industry-sponsored associations on smoking and health in other countries, like Australia. He also finds troublesome that Verband will seek to publicize itself, despite Verband-funded research that "seem to be designed to incriminate smoking.”

82. 16 March 1981, Pelz memo to Dembach, RJR 50092-4173, "Adlkofer issue.”

Report of comments made during a dinner meeting: Adlkofer had no ill-will to Colby who was just doing his job, but the idea to separate the positions as head of the scientific department of the Verband and secretary of the Research Council would not work as it attacked Verband policy.

A Prof. Kowitz of the Research Council, himself a smoker, indicated that smoking probably did cause lung cancer. Perhaps cigarette companies should sponsor courses on breaking the habit, without risk to the industry as "the effect of such courses would be negligible!”

83. 2 April 1981, anonymous, meeting report, PM 1003717566 - 68, "Meeting of the N-PAH-Project Group...at the Verband der Cigarettenindustrie, Hamburg.”

Was nicotine a precursor of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons? "In view of the political and scientific importance of this project, the study should be kept strictly confidential. This could be ensured if the study would be carried out in a laboratory of the cigarette industry.” Philip Morris to be approached to do the study in Richmond, Virginia.

84. 1 April 1981, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50324-6709, "INFOTAB - EC Task Force.”

Opposes commissioning research on the addictiveness of nicotine. Instead, "I feel reasonably certain that it should not be too difficult to find prominent experts in the area of addiction who would write a 'position paper', clearly showing that smoking is not an 'addictive drug'.”

85. 11 May 1981, Colby memorandum for the record, RJR 50266-4132, "Discussion with Bernd Pelz on the meeting notes of the TFA meetings of April 2 and 3, 1981.” [NB. We have the Philip Morris notes only, item 83.]

"We are, of course, dead-set against any attempts to set up an industry lab.” Colby also opposes inhalation experiments with rats and hamsters, suspicious that the experiments will be manipulated to "incriminate condensate [tar] and exonerate nicotine. He wants to convince company representatives on the TFA of "the depressingly low scientific caliber of all the Verband projects, and of the...politically potentially embarassing nature of the projects.”

86. 22 May 1981, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 51238-5360.

Translation of a memo by "Peter F. of Cologne.” Dr. Adlkofer presented his research plan to the Committee of Chief Company Executives at the Verband. He included a large case-control study to "yield data for discussing the study by Hirayama,” animal experiments with sidestream smoke, and analysis of sidestream smoke. Total cost about 2.5 million DM. The proposals were fully supported by Verband, and BAT with Philip Morris wantint to consult with their international associates.

87. 1 June 1981, Pelz telex memo to Colby, RJR 50087-5551 - 52.

Elaboration on the Verband meeting noted in item 86. "Scientists believe that there is little chance that the results obtained by Hirayama and Trichopoulos et al. will be confirmed..... The industry should have the possibility of a close cooperation concerning the set up of the questionnnaire and the performance of the project itself.” Similarly, analysis of sidestream smoke should show that "from dosimetric considerations the conclusion may be drawn that a causal correlation between passive smoking and lung cancer is nearly impossible..... The performance of this investigation by a member company is recommended. The VdC-Board feels that the passive smoking problem can best be tackled by the industry itself by using all its means and efforts.”

88. 3 June 1981, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50324-6679 - 80.

Colby's reaction to Pelz's telex, cautious approval of the studies, although against industy collaboration with studies "being planned by our adversaries.”

89. 12 June 1981, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50266-4848, "Plans for research laboratory of the ...Verband.”

Adamantly opposed to a Verband "owned” laboratory. If Verband's persists, he recommends RJR withdraw from all smoking and health research of the Verband.

90. 18 June 1981, Colby secret memorandum for the record and to M.H. Crohn and S.B. Witt, RJR 50087-9343, "Telephone conversation with Prof. Adlkofer.”

Apparently Peter Lee was heard to make disparaging remarks about the Tobacco Institute, which would make his position as consultant to the Verband "untenable.” "I told A also that I had been very dissatisfied with L's performance in the past, since he used his professional knowledge and critical perception only in negative assessments of studies favorable to Industry points of view, and that I had never seen yet any similarly severe criticisms by L of studies alleging anti-smoking conclusions.” [NB. Review of several documents written by Peter Lee as found in various industry documents show rather the opposite.] "We thendiscussed the visit which another of A's secret emissaries, i.e. Dr. Gostomczek, had made last Monday (6/15/81) to White and Froeb. Gos. Is on his way back to Germany and will report to A.”

[NB. Glantz, Cigarette Papers, p. 415, cites a Brown and Williamson memo 24 July 1981, J.K. Wells, corporate counsel, to Ernest Pepples, B&W vice-president for law, stating unequivocally that both Adlkofer and Lee accepted Hirayama's data and conclusions, felt Tobacco Institute's negative analysis was incorrect. The memo described a 15 July 1981 Verband research meeting in which Adlkofer accused Tobacco Institute of attacking Hirayama even though they knew his work was correct.]

91. 23 June 1981, Pelz telex to Colby, RJR 50432-9766 - 68.

Pelz recommends agreeing to a Verband laboratory on for completely approved projects by the TFA, and a guarantee that it will not lead to a permanent research laboratory associated to a tobacco company. Pelz's reluctance based on the fear that findings will leak out to one or another company giving them competitive advantage, that industry findings are less credible than those of outside labs, and that the Verband might get into product development. [NB. See "gentlemen's agreement,” item 5.]

92. 28 July 1981, O. Stuhl memo to Pelz and Dembach, RJR 50324-6428, "Asbestos -- Court battle between the asbestos industry and the German Environmental Agency.”

In the uproar over asbestos, "Der Stern” published an article citing Solikoff's allegation that smoking increased the risk of asbestos-induced cancer. [NB. In the 1960s, Kent's "Micronite” filter contained crocidolite asbestos.]

93. 31 July 1981, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50213-6566, "Re: Competition (?) To INFOTAB.” [NB. INFOTAB was an industry-sponsored information tracking and response agency, based in London.]

Information has been received that a major international European tobacco retailer's association and its German affiliate are planning an "international” information service on smoking and health. I have discussed this with Wilfried [Dembach] and we have agreed that Dr. Koenig from the Verband should be advised by Wilfried immediately in order to avoid unproductive "duplication” and/or potential embarrassments.

94. 5 August 1981, Colby letter to Timothy Finnegan (Jacob, Medinger and Finnegan), RJR 50479-8179.

Alerts Finnegan to possible statistical flaws in Hirayama study analyzed by "a competent German statistician who is friendly to the Industry,” but his connection would be compromised if the analysis were made public.

95. 21 August 1981, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50443-7973, "Re: Potential inclusion of tobacco smoke in the official German tabulation of threshold limit values of allegedly health deleterious material occurring at the workplace.”

A workplace sub-committee of the German equivalent of the U.S. National Research Council is considering setting standards for a number of chemicals that might cause cancer: acetaldehyde, freon, cadmium, and tobacco smoke. "I am well acquainted with the chairman of that committee, and he does not support the request [to consider tobacco smoke] -- considers it -- (off the record) nonsensical.”

96. 10 September 1981, J. Anderson (RJR Legal Department Employee) memo (partial), RJR 50368-5724 - 25.

Verband is moving into research on anti-smoking organizations in Germany. An interesting side comment is prospect of economists Herbert Stein and Milton Friedman working with the industry.

97. 16 September 1981, Colby memo to Jay Giles, RJR 50092-7334.

With lawyer approval, Colby will share with Verband the design of the new Industry project with Battelle Memorial Institute (Columbus, Ohio) on environmental nicotine and other sidestream constituents. [This was one of several "Special Account 4" research projects with money provided directly by Jacob, Medinger and Finnegan law firm; other special project accounts were similarly funded through law firms. Battelle received $69,000. Between 1976 and 1993 forty-nine research projects and twenty-three consultancies on environmental tobacco smoke were funded. "Tobacco industry-sponsored reviews published in symposia consistently favor the industry's position that tobacco is not harmful.” See Glantz, Cigarette Papers, 305-7, Table 8.1.]

98. 17 September 1981, Colby secret memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50364-6776 - 77, "Re: German closed workshop and prior scientific publications of public smoking: research concept of public smoking case control study.”

Colby indicates that the planned Verband symposium on public smoking may not be held after all, but if it is, "it will be a completely closed meeting by invitation only, chaired by Drs. Valentin and Wynder.... The thrust and intent of the meeting would be to convince as many German, other European, U.S. and other scientists that, with reference to public smoking, there is no real controversy, and that the facts on this problem are all on our side.” Colby also tries to dissuade Adlkofer from his case-control study ("next to impossible to achieve”).

99. 13 October 1981, Colby draft report to S.B. Witt, RJR 50087-5211 - 16.

Colby reviews RJR research projects in Germany. Recapitulates three kinds of research projects: RJR-fully funded - kept secret from Verband until published; Verband-funded through the Forschungsrat (or TFA), presided over by Prof. Schael of the German Government Cancer Research Institute in Heidelberg -- mostly nicotine-oriented; and directly funded by Verband, confidential contract research. Ostensibly RJR has a major say over the first and third. The Forschungsrat research "is supposedly totally independent of Industry influence, except for its general theme.” Colby has little good to say of the latter. The project descriptions are little different from the report of 26 September 1980 (item 70). "There is little doubt in my mind that modest as our effort is, the quality of our research is better than that of the Verband, even though this may only be because of the lack of quality of their research. This, however, encourages me to suggest about a doubling of our German research budget.”

100. 2 November 1981, H.J. Weimann report to Philip Morris, PM 1003582423 - 27, "Meeting of the N-PAH-Project Group on 2nd November 1981 at the Verband....”

Present at the meeting included Prof. Adlkofer, Drs. Fink (Philip Morris), Jenkins, Kaussman (Reemstma), Osdene (Philip Morris), Stuhl (RJR-Germany), Weimann (Verband staff scientist). Philip Morris a major collaborator.

101. 18 November 1981, Colby secret memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50324-7144 - 46, "Re: Suggested funding for RJRT-GmbH/Cologne grants for smoking and health research in Germany.”

Requests help in getting approval for a doubling of the RJR direct grant program, $350,000 per year. The funds are for continuation of all the previously listed projects, with one addition, "relationship between stress and cardiovascular impairments in blue collar workers with special reference to smoking.”

102. 3 December 1981, memo from J.A. Giles to Dr. Ray . Morse, RJR 50053-4362, "Support of medical research.”

If Colby's plans are to be implemented it should emphasize grants to highly qualified scientists, no up-front bias, peer review of proposals and results, more evaluation by RJR and outside consultants.


103. 15 December 1981, Colby memorandum to record, telephone discussion with Dembach, RJR 50266-5138.

Wants detailed input for the statutes of the Third Forschungsrat about to be convened.

104. 28 December 1981, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 503247506, "Re: German study concludes no increase in cancer mortality for the last one hundred years -- a RJR grant. Follow up.”

Dr. Lock allegedly said that while there are important reasons why smoking might be involved in lung cancer, the concept that lung cancer has increased in epidemic proportions is not correct, since it fits into the total concept that overall cancer incidence has not increase -- according to his Hamburg data -- over the last about one hundred years.

Study was prominently reported in the German newspaper, 'Bild am Sontag.” [NB. According to figures from WHO, Tobacco or Health: A Global Status Report (Geneva, WHO, 1997), p. 314, lung cancer mortality in German men rose from 30 per 100,000 in 1952 to about 75 per 100,000 in 1993, peaking in 1985.]

105. 22 January 1982, memo (partial) from O. Stuhl to Pelz, RJR 50201-5706.

1) Austria [Austria Tabakwerke AG, member of Verband] has "totally adopted the concept of the allegedly 'less harmful cigarette'. 2) This agreement goes far beyond the concessions made by the British Industry. 3) Austria will from now on be the main ally of the Verband since Prof. Adlkofer had admitted to me that he is endorsing this concept entirely; especially Dr. Klus, TFA member of Austria will now be much more pro-VdC than he had already been before.

106. 24 March 1982, Colby memo to Pelz and Stuhl, RJR 50433-9785.

Complains that Verband mainly critiques studies "which demonstrate an objective or sympathetic attitude towards the industry.”

107. 26 March 1982, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 51075-0129, "RE: German coumarin research.”

In 1980, BAT-Germany commissioned a study on biological effects of coumarin, a commonly used flavoring additive in cigarette tobacco. RJR went along with project, "especially since RJR had requested from the German Health authorities an authorization to use coumarin in our German products.” Colby withdraws support from the project, attacking the researchers as incompetent. Apparently the study showed adverse health results with doses Colby called "excessive.” [from Glantz, Cigarette Papers, p. 221-22: "Coumarin, which imparts a vanilla- like flavor...was used as a food and tobacco additive for many decades. It was especially valued by tobacco product designers as a flavor booster in low-tar brands. Most commercial use was abandoned when it was discovered that coumarin caused liver damage in both rats and dogs and was suspected of being carcinogenic.” Germany allowed coumarin in German brands as long as the earlier animal studies were repeated. ]

108. 13 April 1982, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50324-6640 - 41, "RE: Use of hamsters as a second animal species in potential German cigarettes Industry project on public smoking -- Difference of opinion with Tim Finnegan.”

Lawyer Finnegan (Jacob, Medinger and Finnegan) asked Bernd Pelz to oppose use of hamsters in addition to rats in passive smoking study. The reason is that "excessive smoke inhalation may result in allegedly near malignant lesions in the larynx of...hamsters.” Colby thinks the results were "favorable from an industry point of view,” since the hamsters didn't get lung cancer. Also, eliminating the hamster model may be a public relations error.

109. 20 April 1982, Colby memo to S.B.Witt, RJR 5122-1904, "With friends like this, we NEED enemies -- Polonium -- lung cancer -- Pro. Adlkofer.”

Colby wryly notes a letter Adlkofer wrote to the New England Journal of Medicine hypothesizing that radio-active polonium, a contaminant of cigarette tobacco (introduced through fertilizers), might be a cause of lung cancer. In this case, Colby favorably quotes the Surgeon General's Report of 1979, which did not credit polonium with such a role.

110. 10 May 1982, Colby memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50266-5408 - 10, "Re: German Cigarette Industry/ VdC research.”

Colby says "It is 'imperative' that Prof. Adlkofer's position [as scientific director] be eliminated.” He proposes a complex hierarchy of committees that appears to give the cigarette firms considerably more control over the research agenda.

111. 3 May 1982, Colby memorandum for the record, RJR 50433-1530 - 31, "Re: Coumarin. Telephone conversation Adlkofer/Colby.”

Adlkofer has reassured Colby that the German Government will not withdraw any of the special permits to use coumarin in cigarettes. Colby says the government has to be reassured that the "lesions” in rats are not cancerous. [NB. Most cigarette companies appear to have removed coumarin voluntarily by the mid-1980s.]

112. 17 May 1982, Stuhl memo to Pelz, RJR 50433-9755 - 56, "Telephone conversation with Dr. Kaussmann of Reemstma.”

Dr. Kaussmann stated that the general impression in the Scientific Commission is - and as far as he could tell amongst other member companies - that since about a year RJR is opposing most projects and is very rarely agreeing to projects.... It is my general impression that in the next VdC Board meeting RJR will come under attack.

113. 1 June 1982, Pelz memo to Dembach, RJR 50266-4593, "Telephone Note, VdC -- Professor Adlkofer...”

Prof. Adlkofer suggested a meeting with Pelz as "relations between the Verband and RJR have been recently hampered by deplorable fictions.”

114. 16 June 1982, Colby memo to Peter J. van Every (replacing S.B. Witt who became VP of RJRT), "Re: Research proposal to the...Verband on an epidemiological study on 'passive smoking' and lung cancer.”

Colby strongly recommends that RJR veto the study on scientific, economic and political grounds, especially "if the study would be flawed and lead to results similar to the Hirayama study.

115. 1 July 1982, Pelz report, 1 July 1982, RJR 500534225 - 28, "Meeting with Dr. Adlkofer... to discuss the Verband research philosophy, and other issues that have caused friction between the Verband and RJR on matters of smoking and health-related research.”

Key Results. 1. The Verband research focuses on three areas of research: a) public smoking, b) risk factors and c) "a less harmful cigarette.” While progress appears possible on a) and b), research on c) will continue to be a point of controversy and disagreement with the VdC. 2. Progress appears to be possible...on the composition and way of operation of the scientific committee, and on the way research projects are approved. 3) The research philosophy of Prof. Adlkofer will continue to be a point of controversy and disagreement, i.e. he being the one who defines the goals and direction of Verband research rather than the members of the VdC.... Prof. Adlkofer said that compared to Philip Morris, RJRTG seemed to be much more dependent on decisions made in the USA.... That smoking was not only correlated with various types of cancer but also constituted a real risk factor in regard to cancer, was to [Adlkofer] beyond doubt.... The US lawyers would do everything possible to maintain that friend-foe relationship between scientists and industry.... In this sense he considered FGC [Colby] more a lawyer than a scientist.... [A] less harmful...cigarette was his main reason for being with the Verband.

116. 2 July 1982, Pelz telex to van Every, RJR 50324-6039, "Epidemiology working group. Meeting with Prof. Adlkofer.”

"From the discussion it became very clear that Prof. Adlkofer's prime objective is to create unrest among industry in order to force industry into a direction of research that he calls less harmful or less assailable cigarette research.”

117. 22 July 1982, Colby memo to van Every, RJR 500534218, "Re: Smoking and health related activities of the Verband.”

1. It has been learned that the Verband pays to Dr. Wynder the absolutely incredible sum of $100,000 annually as a consultant fee.... 2. More importantly, prof. Adlkofer has become more articulate recently regarding his "mission” of trying to bring the German Industry to adopt the "safer cigarette” philosophy... 3. Mr. von Specht is chief executive of BAT/Hamburg, Germany; he is also chairman of the Germany Industry Verband Executive Committee, composed of chief executives of the participating companies (Verstand).... There can be no question that they share the same view on the so-called "less harmful cigarette.

118. 9 September 1982, Stuhl memo (partial), RJR 50101-4828.

RJR opposes Verband activity for a "safe cigarette” because that is the business of the cigarette industry, not the Verband.

119. 29 October 1982, Colby and Nystrom memo to S.B. Witt, RJR 50364-2947, "Re: Cadmium.”

German Government lists cadmium as a carcinogenic compound. They prepare a memo that says, "What little information is available on the cadmium study leads us to believe that the alleged results are highly suspect on their own merits.”

[NB. The US Environmental Protection Agency predicts that a smoker inhaling 20 cigarettes a day for 20 years has an increased chance of lung cancer between one in 20,000 to one in 50,000. As much cadmium is find in sidestream as in mainstream smoke. Heavy smokers also risk kidney disease.]

120. 10 November 1982, Hoel telex to Andrew Napier, PM 1000081212, "Re: Cadmium.”

Has consulted with Thomas Osdene "who has already taken some action in this area with Verband.”

121. 18 November 1982, Pelz report (partial), RJR 50101-4588.

Pelz urges more study of cadmium, "Should it turn out that cadmium indeed plays a role in the formation of lung cancers,” the cigarette industry has a real chance to make a less harmful cigarette by eliminating cadmium.

122. 9 December 1982, G. Scherer (Philip Morris) meeting report, PM 1000131656 - 58, "Minutes of meeting of TFA/TAC held at the Verband...” [NB.TAC is the British Tobacco Advisory Committee, formerly the Tobacco Research Council.]

Adlkofer noted "that the Board of Directors of the Verband expect the scientists of the industry to solve the passive smoking problem using scientific means.” The two groups agreed.

123. 15 December 1982, Dembach memo to Colby, RJR 50432-8534, "TI position paper.”

The US Tobacco Institute wrote a rebuttal to the 1982 Surgeon General Report, titled "Cigarette Smoking and Cancer: A Scientific Perspective.” While the public relations committee of the Verband wanted to use the document, Prof. Adlkofer said it was anything but scientific.

124. 19 January 1983, Colby draft memorandum for the record, RJR 50052-8918 - 21, "Re; Telephone information...from Dr. Stuhl on the January 18, 1983 meeting of the scientists (TFA) of the Verband.”

Significant commitment made to cadmium research, examining lungs and kidneys of cadavers. Several other studies proposed that RJR had opposed (sidestream smoke, polonium platelet aggregation in smokers, nitrosamines, among others.

125. 17 February 1983, Colby memo to S.B. Witt and P.J. van Every, RJR 50574-3084 - 86, "RE: RJR Germany/ Verband/ Research.”

Recommends RJR not support the cadmium research.

126. 12 March 1983, T. Finnegan draft letter (partial) to S.B. Witt, RJR 50574-5870.

Finnegan met with RJR scientist Bob DiMarco to review a White Paper prepared at Jacob, Medinger and Finnegan on smoking and health, intended for RJR-Germany. It was intended to show the Verband where RJR stood in contrast to Adlkofer who "believes that smoking is killing a couple of hundred thousand people a year and that his job is to cut that figure down to only 50,000 or so... [but] because of RJR Germany's share of market it did not have enough clout to remedy this situation.... The paper was drawn largely from materials which we and the U.S. industry had used before in Congress and court.”

127. 21 March 1983, Colby memo to P. Van Every, RJR 50162-6812 - 13, "Re: meeting with Prof. Adlkofer on smoking/health research by the...Verband, March 18, 1983, in Chapel Hill, NC.”

Summary. I made it very clear to Prof. Adlkofer that whatever positions were in the past and would in the future be taken by our representatives in the Industry Scientists' Committee (TFA) and other German Industry committees, were the results of Corporate consensus decisions arrived at after discussion between those concerned at RJR in Cologne and in Winston-Salem.

Adlkofer tried to fathom why Philip Morris and BAT and the German industry so often agreed with him, but not RJR. Colby replied RJR thought his projects were often neither necessary nor urgent, nor well conceived scientifically. Philip Morris gave its affiliates more leeway without checking back at headquarters, while RJR sought to maintain consistency in positions both in the US and outside.

128. 13 April 1983, Colby memo to P. van Every, RJR 50162-6818, "RE: Change of R&D Leadership at Philip Morris/Europe.”

Herman Gaisch, Vice President of R&D at the laboratories in Neuchatel is being replaced. One speculation is his failure to obtain clearance from PM/New York on exceedingly concessionary postures on smoking and health related -- often ill-conceived -- projects by the... Verband.”

129. 13 April 1983, Colby memo to G.R. DiMarco, RJR 50101- 0370, "Re: Philip Morris -- American Health Foundation.” [NB. Ernst Wynder is President of the American Health Foundation, a cancer-research institute based in New York. Wynder, of course, is renowned for his work showing cigarette condensate painted on mouse skin caused cancers, and his seminal 1950 publication linking smoking to lung cancer.]

I have now learned reliably that there are frequent contacts between Dr. Osdene, director of extramural research, etc., at PM/Richmond, and Dr. Hoffman of the American Health Foundation. Whether or not this involves anything beyond exchange of information, i.e., actual research on behalf of PM at the American Health Foundation, I do not know. In this connection I like to recall that earlier this year PM/Europe actively encouraged, and even insisted -- contrary to what in my judgment and in the judgment of others, are the best interests of the American Industry -- on farming out by the...Verband to the American Health Foundation of a project involving radioimmunoassay determination of nicotine and cotinine in the body fluids of active and "passive” smokers.

130. 29 April 1983, Herman Gaisch memo to S. Gunnarsson, PM 2501001001 - 02, "Minutes of the German Verband Meeting of April 19, 1983.”

The decision of the Vorstad is recorded to approve a proposal by Dr. Adlkofer covering two contracts.... One project deals with sidestream toxicology in animals and the other with sidestream dosimetry in humans. On both subjects Philip Morris has a well defined policy: we as a company do not engage in any industry research project or participate in such projects either by planning, contributing or any other way. If third parties do any such work, the "at arm's length” approach is to be observed, i.e. we watch very closely what is going on, thus reserving our right to take any necessary step which might arise from the results of the investigations, from the way they are carried out or from the manner they are interpreted. As on several occasions before, Prof. Adlkofer has by-passed the ordinary consulting procedure of the Verband. This is why Dr. Fink was not given the possibility to warn you not to agree, in the name of Philip Morris, to the two proposals. I am convinced that Prof. Adlkofer deliberately chose this route in order to out-manoeuvre the scientists of the companies. I would like to ask you to be extremely careful in the future when approving anything in connection with smoking and health and make sure that you have either Dr. Fink's or my advice on the particular issue. I have discussed today the whole matter with Dr. Osdene who was also unaware of Prof. Adlkofer's initiative, although he had met with Prof. Adlkofer only a few days before the Vorstand meeting.... In view of the persons and institutions involved in these research contracts, it would be politically unwise for the Verband to go back on the Vorstand's decision. However, we shall now try to minimize any possible embarrassment to the Industry by personal interventions with the appropriate people. It goes without saying that I wish this situation had not arisen.

131. 11 May 1983, Colby memo to R.Di Marco, RJR 50090-8568 - 69, "Re:Weekly Highlights.”

Notes that for use in court, his early memo that visual inspection of the color of lungs cannot distinguish smokers from nonsmokers, that sporting accidents entail a much higher social cost than smoking and alcohol combined, that the Verband was invited to work with the German Government on a report, "Cancer threat from smoking.”

132. 19 May 1983, Colby memo, RJR 50443-7721, "Colby Correspondence Files.”

[NB. In the spring of 1983 it was decided to move sensitive documents to the offices of Jacob, Medinger and Finnegan, ostensibly to avoid discovery in the increasing number of lawsuits against the Industry. Virtually all of Colby's files and literature retrieval system were to go. Colby's own position with RJR was essentially eliminated, and he would go the New York to work at the Jacob, Medinger and Finnegan law firm, paid indirectly through RJR. See RJR 50266-5353, 23 March 1983, and item 4. Also, item 4, p. 116: 15-17, "Most recently, Dr. Koenig noted that Colby may be out of power at R.J. Reynolds. Koenig stated, 'There may be a new philosophy being experimented with by the current R.J. Reynolds management which goes away from the 'flat earth' policy'.”]

133. 20 September 1983, Professor Adlkofer's speech, PM 2501021630 - 39, "Passive smoking, presentation by the Verband der Cigaretenindustrie at the occasion on the NMA [National Manufacturer's Association] in Washington DC.”

Classic apologia for smoking in public places - it might just as well have been written for Adlkofer by the Tobacco Institute.

134. 29 March 1985, G. Scherer meeting minutes , PM 2001227421 - 27, "Meeting of TAC/VdC on passive smoking research held at the Verband...Hamburg, on Friday, 29th March, 1985.”

Adlkofer recites history of passive smoking research, starting with the White Froeb study, Hirayama and Trichopoulos.. "Since then at least eight further studies had appeared most of them confirming the results by Hirayama and Trichopoulos.” Verband still did not accept the link, however, between passive smoking and lung cancer or cancers of any other sites. On the other hand, good research by the industry was needed in collaboration with scientists all over the world. The TAC representatives agreed that the epidemiological study was most important. TAC's approach, however, would be far more cautious than Verband's activist approach..

135. 26 April 1985, Stuhl memo to Dembach (partial), RJR 50419-7416.

Notes that in the end TAC did not offer any cooperation or funding to Verband for the passive smoking studies.

136. 16 July 1985, Charles Nystrom (RJR scientist) report (partial) to A.W. Hayes (RJR in-house counsel), RJR 50422-1613.

Continuing Verband plans for studying Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) [NB. In this set of documents, first time "ETS” is used.] both in rats and epidemiologically.

137. 24 February 1986, C.R. Green (RJR scientist) memo to Alan Rodgman, RJR 50819-2982, "Re: International ETS Working Committee.”

Don Hoel (Shook, Hardy and Bacon) proposed formal cooperation be established between the Verband, the British Tobacco Action Council (TAC), the U.S. Tobacco Institute, Philip Morris and RJR on ETS. "It is expected that this will be the first of two or three meetings per year where the various committees will exchange scientific information and coordinate proposed studies.”

138. 18 February 1987, Charles Green to Rodgman, etc., RJR 50631-7566, " VdC animal experiment on passive smoking.”

Green asks advice on whether RJR-US should participate in the Verband study.

139. 17 June 1988, Don Hoel (Shook, Hardy & Bacon) meeting report memorandum,

RJR 50681-2115 - 28, PM 2021548236 - 37, "Joint meeting on ETS - London, England.”

An extraordinary summit of all the major tobacco companies and their law firms. Represented were (in the order listed by Hoel): Verband, BAT, Reemstma, Philip Morris/Europe, Philip Morris/USA, Philip Morris International, Tobacco Advisory Council, Gallaher, Rothman's, Rothman's International Services, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Imperial, RJR, RJR-Germany, Japan Tobacco, BAT-Germany, Lorillard, Austria Tabakwerke, Covington and Burling, Tobacco Institute, Brown and Williamson.

The objective of the meeting was "to bring together industry scientists to discuss scientific research and strategies on ETS and how these relate globally.” Don Hoel chaired the meeting.

Participants gave national and regional perspectives. Professor Adlkofer noted the increasing activities of anti-smoking groups on the issue of ETS, with Governments and the EEC playing an increasing regulatory role, especially addressed to children's exposure. More [industry] research is needed to counter these activities.

Dr. Adlkofer deviated from the agenda and discussed the direction of ETS research. According to Adlkofer, analytical breakthroughs are unlikely.... Conventional epidemiology has provided few benefits to the industry. A focus is now needed on "modern epidemiology” and human exposure studies, as well as further exploration of the alleged mechanisms of effect. He also called for the identification of a threshold level for risk. Dr. Adlkofer indicated that this approach has already been adopted in Germany. Dr. Adlkofer's suggestion created widespread disagreement among the meeting's participants. Mr. Westcott [Philip Morris consultant] stated that setting a threshold is dangerous because it provides a priori proof of causation for anti-smoking advocates. Mr. Rupp [Covington & Burling] agreed, stating that an acceptable threshold for ETS may nevertheless indict active smoking.... The conference concluded with the finding that existing science could neither prove nor disprove that any impairment of health is caused by ETS. Although a fairly strong position on the relationship of ETS to health effects in children was adopted, the conference concluded that ETS problems in the home are best solved by health education.

140. 10 February 1989, Dembach memo to R.J. Marcotullio, RJR 506816587, "ETS -- Industry reaction.”

German Verband activities in ETS over 30 years have led to "close cooperation with independent scientists from well-known German institutes and universities, [which] has more recently led to a number of publications...characterized by a balanced objective evaluation of the matter.” Recent presentations suggest that the "risk of cancer due to passive smoking is not established.... This positive development...might also encourage others in the Company not to give up this issue which is so vital for our future business.”

141. 20 February 1989, policy review by U. Bluhm and O. Stuhl submitted to Dembach,

RJR 50681-6535 - 43, "ETS -- Challenge for the Industry.”

"In conclusion it can be said that the German Industry is using a great amount of PR-resources and political lobbying in order to establish its position.”

With increasing restrictions on public smoking in Germany the area of contention is in the private workplace and restaurants. The authors worry about EC directives which would apply to all member nations. Verband continues research on animal exposure, dosimetry, epidemiology, and sidestream smoke analysis. All the research results appear to minimize the health risks, minimize the ability to detect such risks ("low risk associations”), or show the limitations of claims about those risks. Toxicological research focuses on individual molecules, such as benzene and ethylene. New research on "risk groups” (e.g., asthmatics, pregnant women) being undertaken. Many German scientists are quoted to support the innocuous role of ETS. D. Schmael (see item 35) remarked, "Smoking bans are political decisions.”

142. 21 December 1991, R Pages memo to Charles Wall, PM 2023223420, "VdC/Forshungsrat.”

"[Walter Fink] hopes that you will not widely distribute the list of Forschungsrat projects because of its confidentiality and the conditions under which he was able to obtain it (private agreement between Fink and Adlkofer over the protest of Brueckner.... At the next meeting of the WPA at the Verband...there will be a discussion of the general subject of how to handle requests by member companies for information on Forschungsrat projects.”

143. 29 January 1992, R. Pages memo to Steven Parrish (in 1995, Senior Vice President of Philip Morris for Worldwide Regulatory Affairs), PM 2023222815 - 16, "Subject: Wynder proposal to VdC.”

Ernst Wynder asked Verband for $500,000 for a two year epidemiological study of lung cancer in Japan and the United States. Pages asks,

What do we gain if we support the study? It very likely [will] provide helpful data on both the primary and ETS issues. In the primary area, it should provide additional data on the importance of dietary and possibly familial factors which are associated with the incidence of lung cancer. (The differences in the dietary habits between Japanese and Americans, especially in the consumption of fats, is the key aspect of the study.) In the ETS area, the investigators will look at misclassification of ever smokers as never smokers and to what extent such misclassification may have contributed to the results reported by Hirayama [NB. A hand-written marginal note helpfully explains, "ever smokers get lung cancer”]. They will also examine to what extent uncontrolled confounding by other factors (diet, familial history of lung disease, etc.) May be responsible for the weak associations between ETS exposure and lung cancer reported by some studies [NB. Hand-written note: "This is key.”]. Down-side: I really don't see any.... Wynder is the key. Final recommendation: You (or Chuck [Wall]) should telephone Adlkofer to let him know of PM's decision.

[NB. Philip Morris may have bought second-hand smoke. Here in its entirety is the abstract of a paper published by Ernst Wynder with Takashi Hirayama as a co-author (!) and published in 1991 (Cancer, volume 67, 746-63):

Vital statistics were examined for the years 1955 through 1985 for Japanese natives and United States whites to elucidate changes in cancer mortality and related antecedent patterns of life-style in these two populations. Results show that lung cancer rates are rapidly accelerating among Japanese males as a consequence of their prior history of heavy cigarette smoking. Oropharyngeal cancer rates are also rising in Japan paralleling increases in alcohol and tobacco utilization. As the Japanese life-style and diet continue to become more "westernized,” the rates of malignancies of the breast, ovary, corpus uteri, prostate, pancreas, and colon also continue to rise. Nevertheless, the mortality patterns of certain malignancies, viz., laryngeal, esophageal, and urinary bladder cancer, are discrepant with their established risk factor associations, suggesting the existence of other differences in risk factor exposure between the two countries. Epidemiologists and health educators need to develop innovative international programs of investigation and health promotion with preventive impact on common malignancies associated with risk-factors of life-style.]

144. 9 April 1992, Charles Wall letter to Paul Hendrys (Philip Morris-Germany),

PM 2050803435 - 39, "Re: Philip Morris Research.”

Discusses Verband research PM is supporting, 34.5% of the current Verband research budget. The budget amounts to 7.1 million DM. Research proposed for 1992 include Ernst Wynder's epidemiology study for $500,000, and a study of active and passive smoking on pregnant women.

145. 23 July 1992, unknown's memo (partial) to Murray Bring, PM 2022850397 - 98.

1992 VdC budget is 8.7 million DM, PM's portion 34% or about $1.8 million.

I view with some concern the research effort in Germany. The Research Council operates much like the SAB [Scientific Advisory Board] of the CTR, and supports research based on grant applications. Much of the research focuses on nicotine.... The Research Council's budget is approximately 2,500,000 DM, of which our share is $519,880. There is additional research funded by the industry outside of the Research Council, and that amount is budgeted in 1992 at approximately 2,900,000 DM, of which our share is $603,060. It is this latter research that I believe could be reduced without a significant downside to the industry.... Our scientists feel, however, that ti is important to keep the research money in Germany, i.e., continue to support researchers in Germany even if we are not supporting them through the Verband.... The relationship between the industry and the German government seems to be a good deal better than the relationship between the industry and the government in this country. As I understand it, there are regular consultations between government and industry scientists, as well as constructive discussions regarding smoking-related laws and regulations. The industry in Germany appears to be more influential with the government than the industry in the U.S. and, for that reason, the industry feels it is important to maintain a substantial research presence. Although I do not believe litigation is imminent in Germany, should it occur, the fact that we are sponsoring research -- whether through the Verband, or individually -- could be of substantial help.

146. 1 October 1992, Lutz Mueller (RJR-Germany R&D) memo to Charles Blixt (RJR in-house counsel), RJR 50847-8285 - 86, "Subject: VdC research with human subjects: ethical implications.”

Writer worries about research by a Prof. Magnussen -- who had been supported by Verband -- on eleven asthmatic children, which was accused by a national television magazine program, "Monitor,” as being unethical. Verband will discuss its role in supporting observational studies in ETS, and PM should as well.

147. 1, 4, and 25 October 1992, Craig Fuller (Philip Morris senior vice president) draft statements to T. Collamore, PM 2047903790, PM 2047903795, PM 2023222729, "Draft Statement for use in the event of question being raised about experiments in Germany.” The second draft is quoted, with bold interpolations the hand-written changes on the 25 October draft.

In response to questions concerning experiments conducted in Germany to determine the effect of secondary tobacco smoke on people [adults as well as children], Craig I. Fuller, Philip Morris Companies' senior vice president for corporate affairs, said the following. [We deplore such tests, especially when conducted on children, and] When we learned in mid-September that the tobacco association in Germany had supported these tests, we requested [demanded] an immediate halt to any such current or planned projects. At the end of September, Verband, the German tobacco association voted in unanimous agreement with our position.” Philip Morris Companies learned of these tests through press accounts. Local Philip Morris officials in Germany had expressed their concern about the proposed research; however, the tests were conducted over their objections. Also [particularly] troubling is the fact that the tests were conducted without proper government authorization. The fact that the tests involved people [children] aging in range from 8 to 66 [strike last seven words] and the failure to gain proper authorization caused the Company to call for a prompt halt of any similar projects in which the industry might become engaged.

148. 29 October 1992, A.R. Tricker meeting report, PM 2028392902 - 04, "Lufthansa Working Group meeting held in Bonn at the Verband...on the 29th October 1992.”

Prof. Adlkofer discussed the proposed ban on smoking on Lufthansa domestic flights, which the airline considered only on economic grounds and "currently developing international trends.” The Ministry of Transport considered health issues, commissioned the Junge Report that supported that emphasis. Verband considered the Junge Report "a biased view.” Research was recommended on air quality on Lufthansa planes, and specific components, "to win time against a smoking ban.”

Verband hoped to use "recommended WHO guidelines” [on air quality] to show that levels produced by cigarette smoking (especially after improved ventilation systems) were not "toxicologically relevant.” The Verband concluded that "to consider the concept of 'within recommended WHO guidelines' which appears to be the only longterm solutions to prevent smoking bans on aeroplanes and in other environments, for example, smoking at the working place.”

149. 6 September 1993, Anthony Andrade (PM in-house counsel) to Charles Wall,

PM 2501003992, "Subject: VdC sponsored research.”

Verband members agreed not to fund any human research without prior approval of all members, and no human exposure work ever involving children or any other "susceptible” group. "Finally, if any human exposure research is to be funded in the future it must employ only exposure levels that replicate 'real life conditions'.”

Letzte Aktualisierung ( Donnerstag, 5. Oktober 2006 )